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Abstract 
 Majority of firms in the world have controlling shareholders, usually a 
family or a state and in few other cases, single individual controls manyfirms 
under an umbrella. The study aimsto investigate the relationship between 
ownership structure and performance of firms. A sample of 100 firms listed on 
Karachi stock Exchange (including 50 private and 50 public firms) for time 
period 2007 to 2011 were used for analysis. Firm’s performance is measured by 
accounting based measures as well as market based measures. Return on asset, 
Profitability,Leverage,Asset turnover, Earning per share and Tobin’s Q are 
taken as independent variableand Equity is used as a dependent variable. The 
statistical tools Mean, OLS, Correlation and T-Test were used for analysis of 
data. It was concluded that privately owned firms performs better than publicly 
owned firms. All independent variables except Tobin’s Q indicated a significant 
relationship with dependent variable which ultimately contributes toward a 
higher performance. Statistical differences are insignificant between private and 
public owned firms. 
 
Keywords: Ownership,public firms, private firms, Karachi stock exchange,firm 
performance 
 
Introduction 
 For past few years ownership structure and firm’s performance has been 
discussed by financial scientists and researchers. They extended their work and 
found differences between public and private firms that can affect the 
performance, growth and profitability (Alee, badersther &Yohn, 2011; Kahn & 
Winton,1998; Suehro,2001; Shah et al,2011). Ownership structure started from 
principle-agent relationship firstly studied by Smith(1776) and further 
investigated by Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Berle & Means (1932). Later on 
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potential problems and advantages of ownership structure to the performance of 
the firm were studied byFama(1983) andJensen(1985). 
 Family owned businesses (FBOs) are privately held firms, in which 
family isnot only the major shareholder but also actively engages in operational 
and strategic management(Davis, 1983; Stern, 1986; Handler, 1989). Specially, 
family firm’s strategic orientation is different from the publicly owned firms; 
they take up business objectives that are discordant with the larger goals of the 
firm, and to choose low-risk strategies that take part to maintain the control of 
ownership to definite shareholders. (Gudmundson et al. 1999; Tagiuri &Davis, 
1992)Berle & Means (1932) studied that public ownership allows a greater 
access to credit, enhanced stock-based management compensation packages, 
external monitoring of the business andgreater promotion of a firm.On the other 
hand public ownership could possibly create agency problems in management 
control. Private ownership also have advantages of better investment decision 
and they have a long term investment scope due to which they take a more 
mature and long term approach towards the management of the firm. However 
this cost can be compensated by cost of private ownership. 
 A firm managed by family members may be potentially less proficient 
and thus cause losses to the firm when compared to firms that are managed by 
outsiders(Burkart et al., 2003). However Performance is very important for the 
public and private ownership because internal and external stakeholders use it 
for their decisions. 
 The objectives set by the publicly owned and privately owned 
organizations are different. Private sector aspires for profit, while the public 
sector look for not only to obtain economic benefits but also to obtain social 
benefits with primary objective being public welfare of various natures (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Publicly owned firms versus privately owned firms 
Public organizations Private organizations 
Are usually monopolies Operating in competitive market 
Serves society Maximize the investment’s profit 
Are driven directly or indirectly 
by politicians. 
Leaders of companies are responsible to 
shareholders, to the board. 
More rigid due to the process of  
Decision making and implementation 
More flexible, easier to manage because 
the decision is taken by single leader 
 
Organize, reorganize and regulate  resources Produce and distribute resources 
Sometimes poorly funded Are financed under its productivity  
or if investment decision is feasible 
Citizens are often poorly informed& 
& being suspicious of government 
Investors and shareholders are well 
informed and the ongoing activities of  
Company and market evolve. 
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 The above discussion highlights that public and private firms both 
have some advantages and disadvantages and effect the performance of the 
companies. The main purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of 
public and private firms listed on Karachi stock exchange and check whether 
ownership affects performance of a company or not.   
 
Objectives: 
Following are the objectives of this study: 
• Comparison of private and public firm’s performance in terms of 
ratio analysis. 
• To examine effect of return on asset on the performance of public and 
private firms. 
• To investigate effect of profit margin on the performance of public 
and private firm. 
• To study effect of financial leverage on the performance of public 
and private firm. 
• To analyze effect of asset turnover ratio on the performance of public 
and private firm. 
• To study effect of earning per share on the performance of public and 
private firm. 
• To investigate the effect of Tobin’s Q on the performance of public 
and private firm. 
• To analyze effects of ratio on performance of public and private 
firms. 
 
Significance of study 
 The study is about performance comparison of public and private 
firms which can be beneficial for investors as an aid in deciding whether to 
buy stock or not. It can behelpful for managers, lenders, and equity fund 
managers in terms of future costs and benefits associated with ownership 
differences. It can bevaluable for policy makers and advisors to form new 
policies or modifying existing policies to attract investors in low cost and 
high gain. Companies can also use this as they can focus on long term goals 
and strategic objectives. Its significance for Govt is that a greater 
consciousness of tax burdens and policy has resulted in a desire not only to 
prioritize services based on need and demand, but also to assure that the 
resources put into services are used to the best advantage. Society demands 
greater accountability for the resources they commit to government. 
Suppliers can use it to decide whether to sell merchandise to a company on 
credit or not. 
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Literature review: 
 Abdullahet al., (2011) examined theimpact of group- and family-
ownership on financial performance of a sample of firms listed on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange for the year 2003 to 2008. They took 158 
companies listed on Karachi stock exchange from which 28 were family 
owned whereas 26 were nonfamily excluding financial firms(like Modarba, 
Bank, insurance companies). The methodology used by them is OLS and 2 
SLS techniques, shareholding pattern from company’s website and for 
performance measure return on asset, profit margin, financial leverage and 
asset turnover ratio and Tobin’s Q. Results showed that the large size firms 
and firms with higher growth rate and higher sales turnover were more 
profitable than small size firms. Firms with higher financial leverage 
showedpoor financial performance. The results of two sample t-tests for 
comparing the means of ROA, Tobin’s Q, Asset Turnover, Debt Ratio and 
Profit margin in family-owned and non-facility owned firms, ROA in family-
owned firms was less than that of non-family owned firms (1.80% family, 
3.40% non-family). The Tobin’s Q of family-owned firm was economically 
larger than that of the non-family owned firms (4.48 for family and 1.28 for 
non-family). There were two main explanations for the indifference in the 
performance of family and non family firms, first was the family business 
not added any value of agency cost and second was family owned business  
indulge in minority expropriations. 
 Agawam & Kroeber (1996) examined the relationship between 
ownership structure and performance of firms. They took 383 large US firms 
in the years 1987. They took percentage of shares held by directors and 
officers which was above 5% as ownership variables and Tobin’s Q were 
taken as performance variables. OLS and 2SLS regression was applied for 
the analysis. Results examined were: Tobin’s Q significantly decreased with 
board outsiders, leverage, and corporate control leverage. And it increased 
significantly with insider ownership. SLS without Tobin’s Q Shareholdings 
by block holders and institutional investors increased significantly by 
corporate control activity. Institutional ownership decreased significantly 
with block holder ownership and vice versa. Leverage increased significantly 
with insider ownership and outside board membership but not vice versa. 
Years of CEO employment decreased significantly with institutional and 
block holder ownership. 
 Ali et al. (2010) investigated the relationship between ownership and 
performance of listed companies in emerging south Asian market and took 
67 companies from KSE 100 index excluding companies having different 
capital structure and whose data was unavailable. Variables taken for 
ownership were percentage of shares held by board of directors and for 
performance measure return on investment, return on equity, Tobin’s Q, 
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Maris ratio. Results demonstrated that the firms with greater shares held by 
board showed worst performances. The calculated value of χ2 was 6.394 with 
P value of 0.041 which was less than 0.05. This showed that groups were 
significantly different from each other on the basis of ownership structure. 
Hence, it showed that ownership structure has a significant relationship with 
performance.  
 Morck et al. (1988) studied the relationship between ownership 
structure and performance of firms. They took 371 largest US firms in 1980, 
combined shareholding of the board by all members which ranges: (0-5%), 
(5% -25%) and (25% -100%) were taken as ownership variables. Top two 
officer’s combined shareholding was a dummy for the founder of board 
presence. For performance they took variables: Tobin’s Q, profit rate by net 
cash flow to replacement cost of capital. Piecewise linear regression and 
OLS regression was also used for data analysis. Their result showed that: 
profitability was increasing significantly for board ownership in the range of 
(0-5%) and decreasing significantly in the range of (5%-25%). Significant 
controls: R&D to size and debt to size. Similar results for top two officers. 
However it was found that foreign ownership have a positive and significant 
effect on corporate governance quality. Concentrated ownership and state 
ownership rights improved efficiency.  
 Barontini & Caprio (2003) investigated the relationship between 
firm’s performance and ownership structure in continental Europe. They 
used data from 675 public corporations trading in 11 countries (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and Switzerland). Ownership variables were ownership patterns 
which were from: official registers held by stock market authorities, 
corporation’s official website and from other sources like World scope, extel 
and Osiris. Valuation variables were: Tobin’s Q, return on assets. Control 
variables were: size of corporation by total asset, growth variable and 
leverage. In all regressions, either with dependent variable Q or with 
dependent variable return on asset the coefficient on the dummy-variable 
“family” was significantly positive. This expressed that for any given 
combination of cash-flows rights and wedge, family corporations tend to 
exhibit clearly better valuation and operating performance than non-family 
firms. Operating performance and valuation were significantly higher in 
founder-controlled companies, and in corporations controlled by descendants 
who sit on the board as non-executive directors. When a descendant takes the 
position of CEO, family-controlled companies were not statistically 
distinguishable from non-family ones in terms of valuation and performance. 
 Qureshi & Burki (2011) examined the corporate governance in the 
business environment of Pakistan providing explanation of salient features of 
corporate governance mechanism in Pakistan. They have used data of the 
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families/groups, a quick review of the board of directors of the listed 
companies on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) and their kin related linkages 
to the key political players and to the key member of civil and military 
bureaucracy substantiate deep rooted cronyism that has been developed and 
nurtured in Pakistan. Business groups and network structures were not only 
organizational in nature but essential for the formation of social capital that 
helped them in generating and sustaining positive socio-economic results, as 
well as generating strategic and competitive outcomes for family firms. The 
development of corporate governance sector in Pakistan outlined that certain 
families/groups had been very resourceful and powerful under all regimes, 
whether civil or military. These families/groups were found to be intertwined 
in complex networks of commercial and non-commercial interests. On the 
one end, these networks were used to extend the boundaries of formal 
business ties to nuptial ties, and on the other hand, these networks were used 
to move from corporate arena to civil as well as military bureaucratic. 
 Habbershon & Williams (1999) proposed that a firm’s performance is 
dependent on certain kind of resources which were hard to imitate and 
thereby providing sustainable competitive advantage. They used grant model 
which showed connection between resources and competitive advantage 
potential. Their resource based literature identified business groups and 
networks as the two intangible resources that gave family firms competitive 
advantage. Moreover, business groups and networks provided the necessary 
mechanism to carryout corporate governance under the concept of family 
firms highlighting that when business groups’ fails, replacing institutions 
provide rules of business. 
 Javed & Iqbal (2009) investigated the determinants of ownership 
concentration and its effect on firm’s performance. They took sample of fifty 
firms from different manufacturing sectors of Pakistan, listed on Karachi 
stock exchange during year 2003-2008. Data was gathered from the annual 
reports of the firms for shareholding pattern and for accounting measures 
return on asset, return on equity and market measure Q ratio for firm 
performance. CGI index and sub-indices that were board composition index, 
shareholdings and audit index, disclosure and transparency index were used 
in estimation model. Results showed that there was negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and corporate governance as indicated by 
negative and significant coefficient of CGI. The results exposed that large 
size firms were more likely to attain better performance.It also showed that 
in Pakistan corporations had more concentration of ownership due to weak 
legal environment.  
 Fan & Wong (2001) investigated the relationship between ownership 
structure and the quality of accounting information in seven East Asian 
economies excluding Japan. They took sample of 977 companies in seven 
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East Asian economies for the period of 1991 to 1995. Ownership structure 
and accounting information were key variables in this study where 
ownership structure was the common shares directly owned by individuals or 
institutions. For accounting information cash flow patterns of the companies 
being used. Results showed that mean voting right of the East Asian 
corporation was 30.44% and the average of cash flow rights were 25.84. It 
indicated the divergence in voting rights and cash flow rights as the mean 
level of voting rights were lower than the cash flow rights. It also examined 
that high ownership concentration and the large separation of ownership and 
control weaken the in formativeness of reported earnings to outside 
investors. Thus controlling owners were apparent to report accounting 
information for egoistic purposes, causing the reported earnings to lose 
integrity to outside investors.  
 Xu &wong (1999) examined the ownership structure and 
performance of publicly listed companies in china within the framework of 
corporate governance. They took sample of 800 companies listed on two 
national stock exchanges from years 1995-1998. They took variables of 
ownership structure and for performance measure return on asset, return on 
equity; regression model and t-ratios were being used. Analysis showed that 
stock ownership significantly affected a company’s performance. There was 
a positive and significant correlation between ownership concentration and 
profitability. Second, the firm’s profitability was positively correlated with 
the fraction of legal person shares, but it was either negatively correlated or 
uncorrelated with the fractions of state shares and tradable A rated shares 
mostly held by individuals. Third, labour productivity tended to decline as 
the proportion of state shares increased. These results suggested the 
importance of large institutional shareholders in corporate governance, the 
inefficiency of state ownership and potential problems in a dispersed 
ownership structure. 
Allee et al. (2011) evaluated the private and public corporate 
ownership and implications for future profitability. They used financial data 
of 1196 public and private firms in 2001. Variables used in the study were; 
return on net operating asset, profit margin, asset turnover, and return on 
equity, return on asset, cost of debt, leverage, sales, and net income. 
Regression model were used and results showed that private companies had 
significantly higher return on net operating asset and higher profitability. It 
was found that private firms as compared to public firms had higher cost of 
debt and higher return on equity. It was also analyzed that private firms were 
more profitable in future than public firms. 
 Bogart & chaudhary (2010) studied the effect of public and private 
ownership on performance. They took sample of Indian railways for the 
period of 1874 to 1912. They used data from the Administration Reports 
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published annually. They constructed the variables of capital outlay, 
passenger and goods earning, gross earnings, working expenses, train miles, 
passenger miles and ton miles. Results showed that exploiting changes in 
ownership within the same railway systems and state ownership reduced 
operating cost by 12%. Traffic and general expenses declined after state 
takeover falling by 9.1 and 16.7% respectfully. They showed that switching 
from private to state ownership did not necessarily lower the performance of 
firm. 
 Estache& Rossi (1999) studied the performance of private and public 
water companies in Asia and Pacific region. They took sample of 50 firms in 
the year 1995. They used variables: operational and maintenance cost 
(COST), number of clients (CLIEN), daily production (PROD), population 
density in the area served (DENS), number of connections (CONS), 
percentage of water from surface sources (ASUP), treatment capacity ( 
CAPAC), market structure (STRU), numbers of hours of water availability 
(QUALI), staff (PERS), salary (SALARY) and a set of qualitative variables. 
Regression models were being used for analysis. Results showed that relying 
on efficiency frontier over usual alternative options have advantage in the 
process of implementing yardstick competition. Models showed that private 
operators were more efficient than public operator.  
 Yaseer (2011) investigated the corporate governance and 
performance. They used a sample of 132 companies listed on Karachi stock 
exchange for the year 2003 to 2008. Variables used in the study were: debt, 
firm age and firm size (control variables), board composition, director’s 
qualification, professional qualification, meeting and leadership structure 
(independent variable), Tobin’s Q, Return on asset and operating cash flows 
(dependent variable). They used panel regression model analysis to 
determine the correlation coefficient. Results showed that there were 
significant differences between family and non-family owned firm’s 
performance. Family controlled companies favoured more meetings to 
enhance firm’s performance. Board composition of family and non family 
firms were negatively related with firm’s performance. In terms of director’s 
qualification only non family controlled companies showed positive relation 
with performance. 
 Feng-Li & Tsangyao (2010) empirically examined the optimal level 
of family ownership concentration. They used sample of 242 companies 
among 18 industries of Taiwan. These firms were listed from 1997 to 2006. 
A Threshold regression test was applied to determine the optimal level of 
concentration of family ownership. Firm’s value was determined by Tobin’s 
Q. The results showed that at the level when ownership concentration was 
below 0.075%, with 1% increase in ownership, Tobin’s Q decreased by 
257.71%. On the other hand when concentration of ownership was 0.075% 
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to 31.76% Tobin’s Q increased by 0.78% with every 1% increase in the 
ownership concentration. When the ownership concentration was 31.76% to 
33.61%Tobin’s Q increased to 1.67%. However, when it was greater than 
33.61% the Tobin’s Q rate of increase decreased to 0.51%.Therefore it was 
concluded that the optimal level of ownership concentration was between 
31.765 and 33.61%. 
 
Theoretical framework: 
 
 
Data and Methodology: 
 The study aims to compare the performance of public and private 
firms in terms of equity. Accounting and market based variables were used 
to compare the firm’s performance. Accounting based variable included 
Return on Asset and Net Profit Margin whereas, market based included 
Asset Turnover, Financial Leverage, Earning per Share and Tobin’s Q. All 
variables were selected after literature review (Han & Naughton, 2001; 
Barontini & Caprio, 2005; Shah et al., 2011). 
 
Hypothesis: 
Hypotheses are drawn as under: 
H1= Return on Asset affects the performance of public and private firms. 
H2= Profit Margin affects the performance of public and private firms. 
Performance 
Financial 
leverage 
Return on 
asset 
Asset 
turnover 
ratio 
Profit 
margin 
Earning per 
share 
Tobin's Q 
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H3= Financial Leverage affects on the performance of public and private 
firms. 
H4= Asset Turnover affects the performance of public and private firms. 
H5= Earnings per Share affects the performance of public and private firms. 
H6= Tobin’s Q affects the performance of public and private firms. 
 
Sources of Data Collection and Sample Selection 
 Secondary data of 100 firms listed on KSE 100 index for the time 
period of 2007 to 2011was used in the study. All financial and accounting 
data used in the study were taken from the annual reports published by the 
firms. These 100 firms were chosen from five sectors including textile, food, 
manufacturing, cement and mineral for the analysis of ownership structure. 
To check the stationarity of data unit root test was applied. If the data is not 
stationary the results will be unreliable and direct application of regression 
on non-stationary variables can give misleading estimates of relationship 
between variables (Diebeld & Kilian, 1999). 
 OLS technique was used to investigate the relationship between 
outcome and predictor variable. T-test was applied in the study to compare 
the performance between public and privately owned firms. 
Detail information about sample data: 
 Public Firms Private Firms 
Initial sample selected 60 60 
Firms delisted or           
unavailability of data 
10 10 
Final sample 50 50 
 
 Initially a sample of 120 firms was selected but due to unavailability 
of data of 20 firms within research time period and delisting of few among 
them during study period, only 100 firms were studied after elimination.  
 
Variables: 
Name         Symbol     Method to find out 
Dependent variables:   
Return on Asset        ROA Net Profit/total assets 
Net Profit Margin          PM Net Profit/sales 
Financial leverage          FL Total Debts/total assets 
 Asset Turnover         ATO Net sales/total assets 
Earnings per share          EPS Net Profit/no. of shares outstanding 
Tobin’s Q          TQ (Total debts+ shareholders 
equity)/total assets 
Dependent variable:   
Equity              E Total assets-Total debts 
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Measuring variables: 
 Performance of firms was measured by following tools: 
 
ROA: 
Return on asset is a measure of earnings that is not inclined by the 
financial structure of the company. It is calculated by: 
    Return on asset= net profit/ total assets 
The ratio of return on asset gives a standard to verify how successfully 
financial managers utilize each dollar invested in the asset of the firm, 
despite of whether the dollar came from investor or creditors. (Gibson, 2001, 
analysis of financial statements; John Wiley & sons, Inc, 3rd edition) 
 
Profit margin: 
Profitability is the ability of the firm to generate earnings. It is a 
relative success of a company’s operations. It is calculated by: 
       Profit margin= net profit/ sales 
This ratio gives a measure of net income dollars generated by each dollar of 
sales. Although it is desirable for this ratio to be high, competitive forces 
within an industry, economic conditions, use of debt financing and operating 
characteristics such as high fixed cost will cause the net profit margin to vary 
between and within the industries. 
 
Financial leverage: 
Financial leverage ratio indicates the firm’s long term debt paying 
ability. It is calculated by: 
    Financial leverage = total debts / total assets  
Financial leverage ratio indicates the percentage of assets financed by 
creditors, and it helps to determine how well creditors are protected in case 
of insolvency. From the perspective of debt paying ability in long term, the 
lower the ratio, the better company’s position. 
 
Tobin’s Q: 
James Tobin and Nobel laureate from Yale University theorize that 
“The combined market value of all the companies on the stock market should 
be about equal to their replacement costs”.  The ratio is designed as: 
      Tobin’s Q = total market value of firm / total assets 
Where, 
Total market value of firm = market value of equity + debt  
Market value of equity = No. of shares outstanding x market share price 
Debt = total asset – equity 
A low answer of Tobin’s Q (0-1) point out that a greater cost is implied to 
replace the firm’s assets than the stock’s value. Thus it indicates that the 
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stock of the firm is undervalued in the market. In contrast a higher answer of 
Tobin’s Q advocates that the firm’s stock is more costly than the cost of 
firm’s assets replacement. 
 
Asset turnover ratio: 
Asset turnover measures the activity of the assets and the ability of 
the firm to generate sales through use of the assets. Compute asset turnover 
as follows: 
Asset turnover ratio = net sales / total assets 
Asset turnover ratio indicates that how effectively manager utilize assets to 
generate the dollar sales. Higher ratio answer is more preferable then the 
lower one. 
 
Earnings per share: 
Earnings per share is the amount earned on a share of common stock 
during an accounting period, applies only to common stock and to corporate 
income statements. It is calculated by: 
Earnings per share = net profit / number of common shares 
outstanding. 
Earnings per share receive much attention from the financial 
community, investors and potential investors.  
 
Data analysis and Results: 
To analyze the relationship between firm ownership and firm 
performance Ordinal least squares method (OLS) was applied. Allee et al., 
(2011) found that ownership plays central role for utmost profitability to 
attract its present and prospective investors. To investigate hypothesis two-
sample t-test was used to compare variables of same category. Correlation 
was applied to find out the relationship between independent and dependent 
variables. 
 
Regression results: 
Private sector: 
Table: 1 
Variable Coefficients Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 16.07714 0.559428 28.73851 0.0000 
ROA 4.669622 1.598914 2.920495 0.0038 
PM 0.013788 0.003242 4.252379 0.0000 
FL -3.472215 0.340041 -10.21117 0.0000 
ATO -0.811768 0.311695 -2.604370 0.0098 
EPS 0.051933 0.024165 2.149101 0.0327 
TQ -0.129500 0.080861 -1.601526 0.1106 
R-squared 0.370849     Mean dependent var 12.39273 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.354578     S.D. dependent var 3.979986 
S.E. of regression 3.197447     Akaike info criterion 5.191434 
Sum squared residual 2371.891     Schwarz criterion 5.293255 
Log likelihood -613.3763     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.232465 
F-statistic 22.79184     Durbin-Watson stat 0.501915 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
Regression equation: 
 Equity=C+β1(ROA)+β2(PM) + β3(FL) + β4(ATO) + β5(EPS) + 
β6(TQ) +∈ 
 Table 1 explains the regression results of privately owned firms. It 
explains that if the coefficients of all independent variables become zero then 
equity will remain 16.01%. R-square results demonstrate that 37% change in 
dependent variable is due to independent variables and remaining change is 
due to the factors which are not being accessible or not considered. As the t-
statistic measures how many standard errors the coefficient is away from 
zero, therefore higher the t-value, the greater the confidence we have in the 
coefficients as predictors. (Bashir, 2011) Result of t-stat shows that only 
ATO, FL and TQ are not showing significant relationship. F-statistic has 
shown reliability of variables being used in the model.  
 
Public sector: 
Table 2 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 15.02447 0.502087 29.92404 0.0000 
ROA -1.621597 2.403304 -0.674737 0.5007 
PM 1.496823 1.563712 0.957224 0.3397 
FL -1.172547 0.650058 -1.803757 0.0728 
ATO -0.145401 0.226644 -0.641537 0.5219 
EPS 0.059185 0.029667 1.994990 0.0475 
TQ -0.033373 0.042887 -0.778165 0.4374 
R-squared 0.079212     Mean dependent var 14.50340 
Adjusted R-squared 0.050287     S.D. dependent var 1.988954 
S.E. of regression 1.938300     Akaike info criterion 4.196213 
Sum squared residual 717.5881     Schwarz criterion 4.312465 
Log likelihood -408.4251     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.243268 
F-statistic 2.738501     Durbin-Watson stat 0.212282 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.014158    
 
 Table 2 demonstrates the regression results of publicly owned firms. 
It explains that if the coefficients of all independent variables become zero 
then equity will remain 15.02%. T-stat shows that all variables have 
insignificant relationship. R-square expresses independent variables brought 
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only 7 % change in dependent variable and remaining change is due to the 
factors which have not been considered. F-statistic shows the validity of the 
model. As F-stat is greater than its P value so the model is valid.   
 
Correlation method: 
Table: 3 
 ROA NPM LEVE ATO EPS TQ EQUITY 
ROA 1.00       
NPM 0.07 1.00      
LEVE 0.18 0.07 1.00     
ATO 0.37 0.11 -0.12 1.00    
EPS 0.50 0.05 -0.09 0.35 1.00   
TQ 0.28 0.03 0.02 0.32 0.48 1.00  
EQUITY 0.04 -0.01 -0.52 0.03 0.20 0.08 1.00 
 
Table 3 explains a multi-co linearity matrix among all variables. 
Dependent variable shows a positive relation with ROA, ATO, EPS and TQ. 
It has negative relation with profitability and leverage. ROA shows a positive 
relationship with all other variables.  Profitability shows positive relationship 
with all independent variables and a negative relationship with dependent 
variable. Leverage shows positive correlation with market variable and a 
negative correlation with all other variables. ATO, TQ and EPS show 
positive relationship with all other variables. (Shah et al, 2011) 
 
Paired Sample T-test: 
Table: 4 
 
Paired sample T-test used to compare the means of ROA, NPM, 
LEVE, ATO, EPS and TQ of public and private firms. The above results 
demonstrate that the mean of ROA, EPS, and EQUITY in private firm is less 
than public firms and they show a negative relationship. T-Test indicates that 
only LEVE, ATO, TQ and NPM have a positive relationship. They affect 
firm’s performance positively. Results of ROA, EPS, TQ and EQUITY show 
an insignificant relationship. However statistical significance of the 
differences in means is negligible. 
Variables Private Firms Public Firms Difference T-Test 
ROA 3.6% 9.7% -6.1% -2.168 
NPM 75.2% 9.9% 65.3% 1.405 
LEVE 60.28% 100.5% 40.25% 4.086 
ATO 121.4% 108.8% 12.6% 1.649 
EPS 252.5% 223.5% 29% -.514 
TOBIN Q 567.3% 401.7% -165.5% 2.339 
EQUITY 1187.9% 1343.4% -155.5% -3.442 
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Findings: 
 Study aims at examining and empirically investigating performance 
of public and private ownership structures of firms listed on stock exchange 
of Pakistan.  Several techniques were employed to examine the performance 
of both sectors. Results have shown that in private sector ATO, TQ and FL 
have no significant relationship while EPS, NPM and ROA have significant 
relationship and in public sector no variables under investigation show any 
significant relationship.  To avoid stochastic properties in data and vague 
information coming out of those results Unit root test was applied to detect 
the Stationarity of the data. OLS was applied in order to apply regression 
analysis technique. R-square demonstrates that 37% change in dependent 
variable is due to independent variables and remaining change is due to the 
factors which are not accessible. Tobin’s Q has a significant relationship 
with dependent variables and it contributes towards higher performance. 
Multi-co linearity matrix explained that dependent variable showed a 
positive relationship with ROA, ATO, EPS and TQ and negative relation 
with profitability and leverage. (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; shah et al, 2011). 
The results from all the tests indicate that ownership structure of private 
sector perform better than public sector. 
 
Conclusion: 
 This study examines the comparative analysis of ownership structure 
and firm performance. Our findings are consistent with existing literature 
that on general level private sector performs efficiently than public sector 
and the findings are consistent with Barontini & Caprio (2003), Javed & 
Iqbal, (2009), Agawam & Kroeber (1996), Morck et al. (1988), Ali et al. 
(2010), Bogart & chaudhary (2010) Fan & Wong (2001) Anderson and Reeb 
(2003). Two aspects of ownership are being considered; public ownership 
and private owned firms. A sample of 100 firms listed on KSE 100 index 
was chosen for the time period of 2007-2011including 50 public and 50 
private firms. 
 Descriptive statistics were used to measure the data and find 
normality and frequency etc. Results indicated that privately owned firms 
perform better than publicly owned firms. All independent variables except 
Tobin’s Q indicate a significant relationship with dependent variable which 
ultimately contributes toward a higher performance.  In publicly owned firms 
only EPS has a significant relationship and resultantly adds toward firm’s 
performance. It means public firms bear more cost than private ones and 
hence lacks profitability. Private firms have a positive relationship with 
return on asset (ROA) and a negative relation with leverage shows that 
private firms employ less debt financing as compared to public firms.  
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Finally it is demonstrated that privately owned firms are better because their 
equity has a significant relationship with NPM, ATO, FL, and EPS as 
compared to the publicly owned firms. There might be several reasons 
behind this comparatively better performance. Private firm’s face less agency 
problems between management and equity holders and trim downs 
transaction cost. It is showed that less debt financing leads toward less 
financing cost. 
 Since the scope of current study is restricted to five years, further 
research is required on other variables to build new hypothesis for firm’s 
performance with a larger data set. The consistency and reliability of data 
and model can be augmented by adding up more variables. These gaps can 
be filled by future researchers as current study is constrained by time 
resource faced by scholars. 
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